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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16591
(and No. 16 7 2 3)

ROBERT JAMES SALMON and
TOMMY LEE BENWELL,
Defendants-Appellants.

REPLY TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
TO PROVE ENTRAPMENT, IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENDANT
TO ALLEGE THAT THE ENTRAPPING PARTY WAS AN "AGENT" OF THE
POLICE.
It is clear that under any circumstances and under
any test of entrapment currently in use in the United
States, there is no entrapment or in other words no such
defense against prosecution and conviction, when the
party who dealt with the accused was a private party
acting at his own initiative and not prompted or encouraged by the police.

The problem arises, however, that it

is unclear what degree of relationship between the government and such an individual is required before the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

individual's acts are imputed to the government for the
purpose of the entrapment defense.

The respondent points

out that there was evidence at the trial of the appellant
which indicated that the informer in this case was not a
"government agent" and "did not work for" the police.
Respondent alleges that therefore, since the informer was
not a police ''agent," there could be no entrapment under
either the subjective or objective test.

Respondent's

Brief, p.7.
For the purpose of this case, however, Section 76-2303 (1)

is controlling on this issue.

Though that section

does not define the necessary relationship between the
police and their informer, it does state that entrapment
arises when the person who deals with the suspect is "a
law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting
in co-operation with the officer .

For a person to

act in cooperation with police, it is not necessary that
the person be an "agent" of the police, in the sense that
that word is often used.

Such a person need not be acting

under the direction of the police, need not be paid by the
police, and need not be "working for" the police, but
merely acting in cooperation with them.
It is true that the Court in State v. Taylor,
P.2d 496

(Utah 1979) did use the term, "agent."

599

That

would be an appropriate word in that case, since the

-2-
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informer in that case was a paid employee of the governm en t ,
an undercover police agent receiving direction from and compensation from the police.

However, the use of that term

must be qualified by the understanding that it can be used
by one person to refer to someone who is a compensated
employee or representative of the government, and by another
person to mean someone who is merely acting in cooperation
with the government for the purpose of entrapping a criminal.
In this case, the evidence was sufficient to establish that
the informer, Mr. Flowers, was not only acting in cooperation with the police but to a certain extent was following
their directions, and was therefore an entrapping "person"
for the purpose of the entrapment defense.
POINT II.
ON THIS APPEAL IT IS PROPER FOR THE COURT TO APPLY THE
"OBJECTIVE STANDARD" OF ENTRAPMENT, AS EXPRESSED IN SECTION
76-2-303(1) U.C.A., TO DETERMINE WEETHER IT WAS ESTABLISHED
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT
ENTRAPPED.
The Respondent, in its brief, does not take issue
with the manner in which the Appellant describes the posture
of this case before the Utah Supreme Court.

As the appel-

lant stated in his brief, the proper question on appeal is
whether it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
appellant was not entrapped.

According to the cases cited

in Appellant's brief, if it is shown that, as a matter of
law, the only reasonable view of the evidence is that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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conduct of the police was such as to rai'se a reasonable
doubt that the appellant was entrapped, then the appellant
is entitled to a reversal here.

See State v. Hansen, 588

P.2d 164 {Utah 1978).
The point of divergence between the appellant's and
respondent's arguments is, rather, what standard of entrapment is properly applicable in this case.

As both parties

agree, Section 76-2-303 of the Criminal Code had never been
interpreted to require the application of the "objective
test" of entrapment until August 7, 1979, the date of the
Taylor decision.

State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496

(Utah 1979).

Prior to that date, the Utah Supreme Court had interpreted
the language of Section 76-2-303 to embody the "subjective
test."

Appellant in this case was arrested, tried, and

convicted before the filing of the Taylor decision, and
the respondent therefore argues that the ruling in Taylor
should not be applied retroactively to the appellant's
conviction and that the subjective test should therefore
be applied by the Utah Supreme Court at this level of
appeal.

Appellant submits that this reading of the law is

erroneous because the Taylor decision is properly applicable to all cases pending on direct appeal at the time
the decision was filed, including this case.

Further,

even if the Taylor decision itself is not retroactive to
that extent, the appellant is not precluded from making
the same arguments that were made by the appellant in Taylor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and obtaining the same result without direct reliance upon
the ruling of the Court in Taylor.
Concerning the retroactivity of the Taylor decision,
it should first be made clear that there is no statutory
or constitutional constraint upon the court to make its
decision either retroactive or prospective only.

From the

cases, it appears that whenever the court judicially adopts
a new interpretation of a constitution or construction of
a statute, it is free to make the application of that new
approach prospective only or retroactive to whatever extent
it chooses.

Johnson v. New Jersey,

8 6 S . Ct . l 77 2 , l 7 8 l , l 6 L . Ed . 2 d 8 8 2

384 U.S. 719, 733,
( 19 6 6 ) .

The general rule, however, is that in subsequent cases
a court, trial or appellate, should apply the law in existence at the time that that court itself considers the case.
The rule dates back to the decision of United States v.
Schooner Peggy, l Cranch 103, 2 L.Ed. 49

(1801).

In that

case, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
It is in the general true that the province of an
appellate court is only to enquire whether a
judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But
if subsequent to the judgment and before the
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes
and positively changes the rule which governs'.
the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied
. . . It is true that in mere private cases
between individuals, a court will and ought to
struggle hard against a construction which.will,
by a retrospective operation, affect the rights
of parties, but in great national concerns · · ~
the court must decide according to existing law '
and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rightful when rendered, but which cannot be
affirmed but in violation of law the judgment
must be set aside.
Id. at 110. '
The rule of United States v. Schooner Peggy continues to
be the general rule accepted in the courts today.

Bradley

v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 s.ct.
2 0 0 6,

4 0 L. Ed. 2d 4 7 6 ( 19 7 4) .

The question then becomes, in what cases or circumstances should the courts deviate from the rule that each
court should apply the law as it exists at the time its
own decision is rendered.

The Respondent argues that the

Supreme Court cases of Johnson v. New Jersey, supra.,
Linkletter v. Walker,
2d 601,

381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed

(1965), and Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,

89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248

(1969) should be controlling

here and require that the Taylor decision be applied prospectively only, with the result that this appellant should
not have the benefit of that decision because his conviction
occurred prior to its filing.
Johnson, Linkletter, and Desist, however, are cases
which illustrate a specific and narrow exception from the
general rule, which ··is not applicable to the present case·
In Linkletter, the court considered the narrow question
whether the exclusionary rule of Mapp, requiring the
exclusion of evidence obtained in a search or seizure which
violates the Fourth Amendment, should be applied
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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retrospectively to cases finally decided prior to the
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684,
6 L . Ed . 2 d 1 0 8 1

( 19 61) .

See Linkletter v. Walker, 381

at 619, 85 S.Ct. at 1732.

u.s.

The Court recognized that a

purely prospective treatment would not even allow the
application of a new rule to the parties before the court,
since even the immediate parties are always tried before
the filing of the rule-setting appellate decision.

There-

fore, there will generally be some retroactive application,
i.e, to the immediate parties to an appeal, in every case.
To determine to what further extent a new rule should be
retroactively applied, the Court considered the history of
the retroactivity rules in the United States and came to
this conclusion, based upon the chronological relation-

ships of certain events:
Under our cases it appears (1) that a change in law
will be given effect while a case is on direct
review, United States v. Schooner Peggy, supra,
and (2) that the effect of the subsequent ruling of
invalidity on prior final judgments when collaterally attacked is subject to no set "principle
of absolute retroactive invalidity" but depends
upon a conside~ation of "particular relations * * *
and particular conduct * * * or rights claimed to
have become vested, or status of prior determinations deemed to have finality"; and of "public
policy in the light of the nature both of the.
statute and of its previous application." ~
County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S., at 374, 60 s.ct. at 319.
Quoted at
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 627, 85 S.Ct.
at 1736.
[Emphasis added).
Linkletter thus made a clear distinction between cases
which are pending on direct review at the time of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rule-changing decision and cases which have been finally
decided and which are sought to be collaterally reversed.
The Court indeed took a rather absolute stance toward cases
pending on direct review, requiring that new rules and
interpretations be applied to such cases, while as to cases
in which the new rule is sought to be collaterally applied,
whether such application is possible depends upon a number
of policy questions.
The subsequent discussion in the opinion, dealing with
the particular policy questions to be asked, pertains only
to petitioners on collateral attack.
Linkletter

The petitioner in

was a habeas corpus petitioner who sought to

have his conviction overturned on the basis of ~-

His

conviction had become final through a judgment of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, in February, 1960, while Mapp was
announced in June, 1961.

Though the Court recognized the

general rule of retroactivity, and cited cases in which
new rules had been retroactively applied even to judgments
finalized before the promulgation of the rule, it felt
that under the particular circumstances of the case, retroactive application was neither required by the Constitution
nor expedient in terms of policy or justice.

But again,

its decision was limited to the case in which a final judgment is collaterally attacked on the basis of a rule promulgated after the final judgment:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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All that we decide today is that thouqh the
error complained of might be fundamental it is not
of the nature requiring us to overturn all final
convictions based upon it.
[Emphasis added~
U.S. at 639-640, 85 S.Ct. at 1743.
The same circumstances appear in Johnson v. New Jersey,
supra.

There, a criminal defendant petitioned to the

Unit~

States Supreme Court for post-conviction relief after the
New Jersey Supreme Court had made his conviction final in
1960.

The petitioner sought to have his conviction over-

turned on the grounds that his confession had been used
in violation of the rules later promulgated by Escobedo v.
Illinois,

378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977,

and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694, in 1964 and 1966 respectively.

In citing the

Linkletter case, the Court recognized the narrow limitation
of that decision to collateral attacks and its non-applicatw
to direct appeals pending at the time of Mapp:
Our holdings in Linkletter and Tehan were necessari0
limited to convictions which had become final by
the time Mapp and Griffin were rendered. Decisions
prior to Lirlkletter and Tehan had already established
without discussion that Mapp and Griffin applied to
cases still on direct appeal at the time they were
announced.
384 U.S. at 732, 86 s.ct. at 1780.
The Court then concluded that for policy reasons, the
Miranda and Escobedo decisions could not be invoked retroactively either by petitioners on collateral review or by
appellants whose direct appeals were pending at the times
of those decisions.

The latter ruling was dictum in the

-9-
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case, however, since the facts dealt only with a collateral
petitioner, as indeed the Court recognized by stating:
Of course, States are still entirely free to effectuate under their own law stricter standards than
those we have laid down and to apply those standards
in a broader range of cases than is required by
this decision.
384 U.S. at 733, 86 S.Ct. at 1781.
Desist v. United States, supra., is a much more difficult case to square with the general rule of United States
v. Schooner Peggy, supra.

Desist agreed with Johnson on

the proposition that new constitutional rules affecting
criminal procedure are not required by the Constitution
nor by statute to be applied either prospectively or retrospectively, even in regard to cases currently pending on
direct review.

On the grounds of policy considerations,

the Court therefore held that the exclusionary rule of Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d
576

(1967) should not be available even to appellants whose

cases were pending on direct review at the time Katz was
decided.

Since the appellant in Desist was in fact an

appellant whose case was pending on review at the time of
the Katz decision, the holding of Desist was a clear
departure from the _,general rule of Schooner Peggy and not
merely dictum as in Johnson.
However, the Desist case points out additional reasons

why the Linkletter, Johnson, and Desist decisions are
merely excep~ional cases and not relevant to the questions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in this case.

First, all three cases dealt with consti-

tutional rules for the exclusion of evidence.

In deter-

mining whether they should be applied to cases pending on
appeal at the time the rules were promulgated, the primary
factor used by the courts to argue against retroactivity
is the simple observation that the purpose of such rules
is to deter police conduct, not to exonerate the defendant, and that since the rule is promulgated at a time
when past police conduct has already occurred, the retroactive application of the rule would have no deterrent
effect.

As stated in Desist:
Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be
served by the new constitutional rule.
This
criterion strongly supports prospectivity for a
decision amplifying the evidentiary exclusionary
rule .
"all of the cases * * * requiring the
exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on
the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal
police action. * * * We cannot say that this
purpose would be advanced by making the rule retrospective.
The misconduct of the police * * * has
already occurred and will not be corrected by
releasing the prisoners involved."
381 U.S. at
636, 637, 85 S.Ct. at 1741. Quoted at 394 U.S.
249, 89 S.Ct. at 1033, 1034.

Further, Linkletter, Johnson, and Desist all dealt with
the retroactivity or prospectivity of constitutional rules
of criminal procedure, and not with statutory provisions
defining substantive defenses and burdens of defendants.
As pointed out in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S.Ct.
876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29

(1973), different considerations apply

when the rules in question affect more than the procedures
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to be followed at a criminal trial.

In Robinson, a

criminal habeas corpus petitioner, whose conviction was
final before the filing of the decision of Waller v. Florida
397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970), sought
after the decision in Waller to have his conviction overturned on the grounds that under the double jeopardy rules
of Waller, his conviction constituted double jeopardy.
The Court examined the Linkletter decision, together with
its progeny, and concluded:
Prior to this Court's 1965 decision in Linkletter
v. Walker . . . there would have been less doubt
concerning the retroactivity of the Waller holding.
For, until that time, both the common law and our
own decisions recognized a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions
of this Court .
. subject to limited exceptions
. In Linkletter, the Court, declaring that
it was charting new ground (381 U.S., at 628 and
n. 13, 85 S.Ct., at 1737) held that with respect
to new constitutional interpretations involving
criminal rights "the Constitution neither prohibits
nor requires retro-spective effect." . . . We do
not believe that this case readily lends itself
to the analysis established in Linkletter . . . .
Linkletter . . . dealt with those constitutional
interpretations bearing on the use of evidence or
on a particular mode of trial. Those procedural
rights and methods of conducting trials, however,
do not encompass all of the rights found in the
first eight Amendments.
Guarantees that do not
relate to these procedural rules cannot, for retroactivity purposes be lumped conveniently together
in terms of analysis.
Linkletter indicated, for
instance, that only those procedural rules affecting "the very integrity of the factfinding process"
would be given retrospective effect . . . In terms
of some nonprocedural guarantees, this test is
simply not appropriate. * * *
The Court then held that the guarantee against double
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jeopardy is sufficiently different from the constitutional
rules discussed in Linkletter to be analyzed by different
methods.

Since the right against double jeopardy has the

effect of preventing the trial of the defendant from taking
place at all, while the exclusionary rules discussed in
Linkletter, Johnson, and Desist are merely procedural rules
affecting the admissibility of evidence and the conduct of
the trial but not giving rise to affirmative defenses or
bars to prosecution, the analysis of Linkletter is not
sufficient.

Accordingly, the Court held that the general

retroactivity rule should apply and found that the double
jeopardy rule of Waller applies retroactively to judgments
finalized before the rendering of that decision, and to
cases pending on appeal at the time of the decision.
Respondent argues that since the entrapment defense
has as its purpose the deterrence of illegal police conduct,
the rules of Linkletter, Johnson, and Desist should apply
here.

However, that argument overlooks a number of

important factors.

While those cases dealt with consti-

tutional rules regulating the procedure of criminal trials
and affecting the admissibility of evidence, the entrapment defense is not merely a procedural rule.

Proof of

entrapment does not result merely in the exclusion of
evidence which was obtained as a result of such police
conduct.

Rather, it results in the complete exoneration

of the accused.

Entrapment is not a mere procedural or
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evidentiary question; it is a matter going to the criminal
responsibility of the defendant.

Under the subjective

theory of entrapment, it could certainly not be said that
the purpose of the defense was to deter improper police
conduct, since as long as the defendant's predisposition
was shown, any police conduct would be tolerated, no
matter how unseemly.

Although the focus of the objective

test is directly on the conduct of the government officials,
it still cannot be said that the only purpose of the rule
is to deter certain police conduct, since the rule has the
effect of exonerating the defendant completely and not
merely of excluding tainted evidence.

The entrapment

defense is of such a nature that the rules and analysis of
the cases above are simply not applicable.
Furthermore, even if the Taylor rule were to be analyzed
on policy grounds for the purpose of determining whether
it should be applied prospectively only, it is clear that
the application of that rule to those cases pending on
direct review at the time of its filing would work no
burden or injustice upon the State.

Appellant does not

contend that the rule should be available to petitioners
whose judgments have been finalized as of the time of the
Taylor decision, since that would occasion unnecessary and
difficult administrative problems.

Rather, the availability

of the rule to the appellant here and to others whose
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appeals were pending at the time of the Taylor decision
merely places their rights on a par with those of the appellant in the Taylor case itself.

What justice could there

be in allowing one defendant to pursue innovative arguments to a successful result and denying another defendant
the benefits of that result merely because his case

follow~

the other by a short period of time?
Cases dealing with the retroactive effect of new entrapment rules have generally held them to be available to
defendants whose cases were pending on appeal.
v. Branam, 390 A.2d 1186

In State

(Sup.Ct.App.Div.N.J. 1978) the

Supreme Court of Jew Jersey had previously adopted a rule
providing that entrapment is established, regardless of the
predisposition of the defendant, whenever the police
furnished a defendant with narcotics for the purpose of
inducing him to sell it to an undercover agent.

The defen-

dant in the instant case had engaged in unlawful acts priw
to that decision, but was tried after the decision and
sought to have the court instruct the jury in accordance
with the new rule.

The trial court refused to do so.

On

appeal, the Court stated:
. the State herein contends that because ~
was handed down 18 months after the commission of
the instant offenses, a charge in conformity with
that opinion would give to it an impermissible
retroactive effect.
The State asserts that ~
merely sets forth a prophylactic rule designed to
deter unacceptable police conduct and that, because
the police action here is beyond deterrence,
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retroactive application of the rule would be meaningless:
It adds that the police here had also
relied in good faith upon the state of the law
prior to Talbot which gave no indication that such
conduct contravened "fundamental fairness." We
disagree .. Without enumerating the many considerations which may determine whether or not a decision is to have retroactive effect, and the many
decisions concerning them, we determine that the
Talbot rule applies to all cases then pending for
trial or on direct appeal.
390 A.2d at 1189.
Thus, the court recognized that the new entrapment rule
should apply to cases pending on appeal at the time the
new rule was promulgated, in spite of the fact that the
police conduct in any particular case might be beyond the
reach of any deterrent effect that the new rule might have.
Since the reasons for making the entrapment rule retroactive
to that extent do not depend upon the date of the alleged
police conduct but rather upon the date of the promulgation
of the new rule, the retroactivity would include cases
pending on appeal as well as cases currently awaiting trial.
Similarly, the State of Michigan has held that even
though the adoption of a new entrapment rule was to be
given prospective application only, such prospective application included application to cases pending on appeal at
the time of the promulgation of the new rule.

In People

v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. Sept. 18, 1973), the
Supreme Court of Michigan adopted the objective test of
entrapment.

Later cases established that the decision of

that case was to have prospective application only. People
v.

Auer,

227 N.W.2d 528

(Mich. 1975). Nonetheless, in
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People v. Alford,

251 N.W.2d 314

(Ct.App.Mich. 1977), the

court held that appellants whose offenses had occurred
prior to the date of the Turner decision

were entitled to

the new rule in all proceedings held after the date of that
decision, including the appellate hearings.

Such applicatior.

is literally "prospective," but is also "retroactive" in
the sense that cases pending on appeal at the time of the
decision would be included, although some of the "proceedings" in any particular case might already have

occurr~.

Finally, a similar approach was taken in United States
v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798

(9th Cir. 1976) in which the Ninth

Circuit Court held that the adoption of a new rule allowing
a defendant in the federal courts to allege entrapment
without first admitting the alleged offense would be
applicable to all cases pending on direct appeal at the
time the new rule was promulgated.
In light of these cases and arguments, the Appellant
concedes that the application of the Taylor rule to this
hearing on appeal is not mandated by statute, constitution,
or the Taylor opinion itself or by any later decision
construing it.

However, it is clear that considering these

cases and this particular entrapment rule, it is entirely
proper for the Utah Supreme Court to give Taylor effect to
all cases pending on direct appeal at the time that decision
was rendered.

Whether such treatment is "prospective" or

~etrospective"

is merely a matter of semantics, the
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important factor being that justice is best served by
this Court applying today the rule of law that exists today.
POINT III
EVEN IF TAYLOR IS NOT HELD APPLICABLE TO THIS APPELLATE
HEARING, THIS APPELLANT MAY STILL ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULT
WITHOUT RELYING UPON THE TAYLOR DECISION.
The Respondent,

in its brief, p. 8, stakes its argument

on the assumption that the Appellant has sought the retroactive application of Taylor.

Appellant, however, did not

in his brief rely upon retroactive application of Taylor.
Although it is shown above that such application of Taylor
to this case would be entirely proper and desirable, the
Appellant in his brief recognized that the Taylor opinion
was void of language making its application either prospective or retrospective.

Appellant therefore sought to

rely upon the entrapment statute itself, Section 76-2-303,
and other statutes and decisions to show that the applicable
standard to be applied is the objective standard of entrapIn other words, Appellant sought to make the same

ment.

arguments which the defendant made in the Taylor case
itself.

As a matter of logic and policy, there is no

reason why arguments which were successful in Taylor
should not also be successful here, six months after Taylor.
Since the adoption of the objective test in Taylor was
based primarily upon an enlightened and correct reading
of the applicable statutes, and not upon changes in
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circumstances or in policy, there is no reason why the
Appellant today cannot point to the same statutes and
receive the same response as the defendant in Taylor. For
that reason, Taylor is cited in the Appellant's brief only
for the purpose of referring to the applicable statutes
and their relevance to the issue here.

See Appellant's

Brief, p. 8.
Nor is the Appellant, having not relied in his Brief
directly upon the effect of Taylor on this case, which was
pending on direct appeal at the time of the Taylor decision,
precluded from enjoying the effect of that decision now.
For an appellant to have his case fall under the scope of
a prior judicial decision,

it is not necessary for him to

rely directly upon that decision in his brief.

The tribunal

hearing his appeal is required to apply the law existing
at the time of its hearing, to the extent allowable, regardless of whether or not the appellant directly cites such
law.

In this case, since the Brief of the Respondent and

the Appellant's Reply have now adequately discussed the
issue of the relevance of Taylor here, the Appellant therefore submits that he is entitled to a judgment based upon
the "objective" standard of Section 76-2-303, either by
reason of the holding in the Taylor case or by reason of
the same arguments made by the defendant in the Taylor
case.
-19-
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POINT IV
APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE STATEMENTS OF THE
INFORMER WAS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE, REGARDLESS WHETHER
THE INFORMER WAS TELLING THE TRUTH WHEN HE MADE SUCH
STATEMENTS TO THE APPELLANT.
In Point II of the Brief of the Respondent, there is
a hodge-podge of confusing language concerning the nature
and admissibility of second-hand statements offered into
evidence by a witness at trial.

The question arises over

the admissibility, and erroneous exclusion by the trial
court, of the appellant's testimony concerning statements
made to him by the informer which the appellant contends
constituted inducement to commit the offense.

Respondent

contends that if such statements were offered for anything
but their truth, they would be irrelevant and excludable,
but if offered for their truth, they would still be hearsay and excludable.

The Respondent then alleges that unless

the statements were true, they could not show that the
appellant had been entrapped.
fusion,

His argument creates con-

however, as to what "statements" he is referring

to: the statements of the informer to the appellant, or the
testimony of the appellant at trial as to the fact that
those statements we-re made.
For the purpose of clarity, Appellant submits this
explanation of the proper rules applicable here.

First,

whether the statements made by the informer to the Appellant were true or not is irrelevant.

If the informer had
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said to the Appellant,

"Rob that store or I'll kill you,"

and the Appellant had testified to his making of that
statement, it would be irrelevant for the purpose of the
entrapment defense whether the informer had spoken truthfully, i.e., whether the informer really would have killed
the Appellant for not robbing the store.

The importance

of the Appellant's testimony would lie, not in the truth
of the informer's statement, but in the truthfulness of the
Appellant's testimony that such statements were actually
made and in the effect that such statements, truthful or
not, would have had on the Appellant in causing him to obey
the order.

Therefore, for the purpose of relevance, it is

not necessary for the informer's statement to have been
true, but only that it had been made.
Second, it is clear here that the Appellant did not
wish to prove that what the informer had stated to him was
true, but rather he only wished to testify that the

infor~r

had made certain statements which, true or not, had induced
the Appellant to commit the offense.

If the Appellant's

testimony is accepted as true, it proves the making of
those statements, and is crucial to the issue of entrapment, regardless whether the informer, when he made the
statements, was telling the truth or merely trying to
induce

the Appellant to commit a crime by telling him lies.

Thus, it might be said that the Appellant, when testifying
of the informer's statements, was offering his own testimony
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as true,

i.e, that the statements were made.

But at the

same time he was not offering the statements themselves
as true,

i.e., that the informer was being truthful when

he tried to induce the appellant to commit the crime.
Finally, then, it is clear that the statements offered
by the Appellant in his testimony were not hearsay, since
he offered them not to prove their truthfulness but to
prove their existence.

Whether or not the statements were

true is irrelevant, since the crucial factor is the truthfulness of the testimony that they were made and their
influence on Appellant's behavior.

Thus, contrary to the

Respondent's statement, it is not necessary that the
informer's statements be true before they would be relevant
here, and it is proper that the Appellant could testify to
the fact that those statements were made without affirming
the truth of those statements.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

SHELDEN R. CARTER
Utah County Legal
Defender Assoc.
107 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84601

ROBERT J. SCHUMACHER
Utah County Legal Defender
Assoc.
107 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Appellants
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